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Sustainable development has become a major object of study across various disciplinary 
fields in experimental and social science alike. It represents a major concern from the 
perspective of evolutionary political economy understood in its broadest sense. Aside from a 
few specific contributions, regulation theory surprisingly has not much engaged the topic. 
One strand of scholarship has focused on the relations between techno-economic paradigms 
and long wave accumulation dynamic (Mjøset and Kasa, 1994). Another has more 
specifically focused on how and how far political economy claims have an influence on the 
link between capital accumulation and core societal relations (Lipietz, 1995b; O'Connor, 
1994). More recent views reflect upon potential institutionalised compromises between a 
finance-led growth regime and the broader understanding of social and environmental 
sustainability (e.g. Aglietta’s (2005) notion of sustainable value). All of them attempt to 
include sustainable development concerns into regulation theory; yet they all remain largely 
disconnected form current developments in ecological economics and international political 
economy. This paper borrows from these two fields in order to assess and complement 
regulation approaches’ inability to fully appraise environmental concerns.  
The paper argues that by combining ecological economics, IPE and regulation approaches 
more closely, one may provide an account of the apparent contradiction between the utopian 
aspect of sustainable development and the ability of capitalism to pragmatically deal with 
ecological crises. It explores how ensuing institutional forms inevitably take sustainability 
claims into account. It assumes that such forms revolve around the emergence of a new type 
of evolutionary environmental regulation whose coherence is paradoxically at once open-
ended, fragmented and hybrid. This feature clearly reinforces the extreme difficulty in 
thinking about ecological regularities. The paper analyses core elements of such institutional 
forms and how far they can be identified as a new type of fragmented evolutionary 
environmental regulation. Section 1 provides background on the notion of sustainable 
development. Sections 2 examines the prospects and limits of regulation theory on global 
ecological issues and presents lessons could be drawn from ecological economics and 
international political economy approaches for opening new routes to appraise current and 
future environmental concerns of capitalism. Section 3 explores the emerging form of 
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reached, in which disillusion regarding sustainable development goes hand in hand with 
increasing awareness of the inescapability of a policy shift in its favour. 
1.  Background: common crisis and the future 
The notion of sustainable development was crystallised and popularised in the 1987 Report of 
the UN World Commission on the Environment and Development chaired by former Prime 
Minister of Norway Gro Harlem Brundtland. The notion built upon long established lines of 
thought which had developed substantially over the previous 20 years. It provided the first 
comprehensive attempt to bring together development claims and environmental degradation 
concerns at a global institutional level. Roots of the conflict go far back. Whilst non-industrial 
systems of production had their own environmental problems, industrial capitalism has 
involved a major shift, making for the first time in history a whole material transformation 
process dependant upon fossil energy (Vatin, 2005). The Brundtland report also emerged out 
of North-South cleavages. As Indira Gandhi, India Prime Minister, put it in a speech at the 
UN Conference on Human Environment held at Stockholm in 1972: ‘Aren’t misery and need 
great polluters? … We cannot improve the environment where misery reigns. And we cannot 
eliminate misery without the support of science and technology’ (Nations Unies, 1972, p. 18). 
That conference marked a crucial stage in the emergence of a global approach to social and 
ecological questions. Above all, it fixed in the popular consciousness the idea of “Spaceship 
Earth”, coined a few years earlier by Kenneth Boulding. On its own, the title of the 
preparatory report conveyed the message in a nutshell: Only One Earth. As René Dubos, one 
of its co-authors and instigator of the slogan Think Globally, Act Locally, declared, “we are 
now moving into the stage of global social evolution. The problems of Spaceship Earth affect 
humanity world-wide and can only be handled from a world-wide perspective” (Nations 
Unies, 1972, p. 22). Development was, however, deliberately ignored at Stockholm, even  if 
later claims for a New International Economic Order included such radical proposals as 
“ecodevelopment”.  
A wide range of formal and informal bodies pushed forward the twin agenda of development 
and environment in the decade following the Stockholm conference. Whilst transnational 
private councils such as the Trilateral Commission gave considerable importance to the 
subject, bodies more firmly rooted in the formal system of the United Nations launched 
several initiatives to keep the momentum in a context where North-South relations tended to 









































9- 3 - 
International Development Issues (the so-called North-South Commission) chaired by former 
German Chancellor Willy Brandt published in 1980 an influential report entitled To Ensure 
Survival. Common Interests of the Industrial and Developing Countries. The same year, 
several UN agencies brought governments on board of a World Conservation Strategy, which 
popularised the term sustainable use. Before long, however, the process appeared to be 
leading nowhere as renewed Cold War antagonisms tended to take centre stage. In 1983, the 
United Nations General Assembly set up a new commission, this time with an explicit 
mandate to consider the link between development and the environment.  
Four years later, the Brundtland report Our Common Future marked a watershed in the 
political and environmental landscape of the contemporary world. It became the basis of the 
1992 Rio “Earth Summit” – the first of a series of world conferences that followed the end of 
the Cold War. Once launched, the concept of sustainable development circulated so widely 
that its original definition is still referred to in the literature: “a form of development that 
meets the need of the present without compromising the need of future generations to meet 
their own needs”. Although criticised on various grounds, such a synthesis of environment 
and development underpinned the reinvention of international action on worldwide 
inequalities and the emerging global ecological crisis. The Brundtland Report acknowledged 
that this required the engagement of a wide range of actors beyond states and 
intergovernmental organisations, such as NGOs, expert communities and private firms. To 
this end, it pointed out three directions most likely to support a swift and comprehensive 
implementation of sustainable development. Whilst a higher level of global cooperation 
implying all those actors and the extension of the time horizon of development concerns were 
largely expected, quite surprisingly, the report also recommended a massive increase in 
economic growth – once estimated at a factor of 5 or 10 by Mrs Brundtland herself
1.  
Responses to these new horizons of global capitalism have differed widely. Quite rapidly, 
however, two opposing views emerged from the constellation of power behind the new 
currency gained by the concept of sustainable development. On the one hand, there were 
those who saw in sustainable development a new utopia for saving the planet and its 
population; on the other, were those who shared a pragmatic view according to which 
inventive platforms of global governance, together with a reasonable growth rate following a 
new wave of technological innovation would be able to mitigate the global ecological crisis in 
the long term. Before exploring in more detail how such conflicting claims may have 
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impinged upon new forms of regulation in contemporary capitalism, we will first turn to the 
prospects and limits of regulation theory in this regard. 
2.  New routes for regulation theory 
While regulation theory’s first and foremost subject matter has been Fordism and its ongoing 
crisis since the early 1970s, quite surprisingly, it has not much engaged the link between the 
demise of Fordism and the emerging ecological crisis. In 1993, Lacroix and Mollard claimed 
that “regulation theory has until now given little heed to the environment issue”
2. Fitteen 
years later, things do not seem to have changed to a great extent. As the preceding section has 
shown, the demise of Fordism was clearly related to broader concerns regarding the 
environmental agenda, North-South relations and collective security on the global stage. This 
section discusses the prospects and limits of regulation theory on the twin crises of Fordism 
and ecology and presents how lessons could be drawn from ecological economics and 
international political economy approaches for opening new routes to appraise current and 
future concerns regarding environmental issues of capitalism. 
2.1. Regulation approaches and the twin crisis of Fordism and ecology 
Two strands of scholarship can be distinguished among regulationist-inspired studies of the 
twin crises of Fordism and ecology. Whilst the first provides long-term historical perspective 
on environmental problems related to successive stages of techno-economic paradigms, the 
second is more focused on conceptualising institutional compromises resulting from 
ecological pressures on capitalism. The first approach is inspired by a neo-Schumpeterian 
view on the link between long waves of the world economy and successive techno-economic 
paradigms embedded in social relations (Mjøset and Kasa, 1994). Whilst such techno-
economic paradigms reflect particular supplies of energy, its transformation into a leading 
sector, and its impact on the social and natural environment, they rely on distinct modes of 
regulation and international coordination. Accordingly, each stage of capitalist development 
brings with it a specific form of environmental problems. As Fordism has massively and 
globally spread a paradigm based on oil and automobiles (from 53 millions in 1950 to 389 
millions in 1986 (Mjøset and Kasa, 1994, p. 184)), it set the stage for situating environmental 
issues at the global level as compared to local and regional problems of the late eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. Acid rain, the reduction of the ozone layer and the emergence of 
                                                 
2 Anne Lacroix, Amédée Mollard, “Prospects for the regulation of agriculture under environmental constraints”, 
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global warming are only the first and most prominent troubles. According to Mjøset and 
Kasa, technological innovation can solve some problems, but a cumulative effect remains, 
which is likely to increase today’s consciousness of environmental problems and the need for 
further technological change in addressing them in the future. The question for post-Fordism 
is therfore whether present-day technological trends can reduce emissions from burning fossil 
oil. Information and bio-technologies are regarded as the most likely candidates for 
eliminating a number of bottlenecks and dilemmas of the Fordist production process: ‘both 
biotechnology and microelectronics facilitate savings on raw materials … In any case the new 
production processes are probably less of a menace to the environment than the Fordist ones’ 
(Mjøset and Kasa, 1994, p. 189). Such a view echoes those regarding a new green techno-
economic paradigm as a potentially radical shift away from the high material- and energy-
driven era of Fordism (Freeman, 1992). Resources in the hands of a hegemonic power are 
identified as the key framework conditions for such a shift. The current US position is seen, 
however, as the major hindrance for a more constructive environmental politics at the 
international level: ‘the US is the only actor which would have the power to enforce 
environmental action at the global level. (…) the unwillingness to launch such action signifies 
that the US – just like England earlier – is tied to the growth model which it once pioneered’ 
(Mjøset and Kasa, 1994, p. 192).  
Such an account provides a striking emphasis on the material weight on which technological 
progress and their environmental impact rely. Moreover, the neo-Schumpeterian perspective 
on techno-economic paradigms echoes the prominence given to long wave accumulation 
dynamic by regulation approaches in discussing conflictual issues of growth regimes.  The 
broader institutional and political context is also rightfully taken into consideration in 
addressing environmental-friendly technological changes. In stressing the weight of history 
and material structures, it marks the limits for likely epochal changes out of the current 
ecological crisis. Yet, the way such changes may occur is not discussed, except for naïve 
expectations on the benign role of the hegemonic power in the world economy. Accordingly, 
the United States is identified as both the knight in shining armour and the mischievous 
demon! The United States is so far undertheorised that we cannot understand the power base 
for any such potential change: shall we consider the US State and its position within the 
balance of power in the world order, the US way of life and its diffusion worldwide, the 
weight of the US economy and its production structure? Moreover, should all theses aspects 
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long-term historical understanding of environmental problems in capitalism impairs the 
conceptualisation required to discuss ways out of the twin crises of Fordism and ecology.  
In contrast, the second stream of regulationist-inspired analyses provides a sophisticated 
conceptualisation of current and future environmental issues. It often lacks empirical and 
historical ground, however. The political ecology perspective of Lipietz has been the most 
straightforward attempt to analyse how a post-Fordist regime could fix the fate of the rise of 
global environmental problems. From this standpoint, labour-capital relations are entwined in 
ecological concerns (Lipietz, 1997). Scenarios on a new accumulation regime call for 
attention to the ever-mounting worldwide level at which institutional compromises could 
address the political economy of global environment: “For the first time, we are involved in 
the collective management of global ecological crises” (Lipietz, 1995b, p. 118). This involves 
thornier tensions than classical class struggles of industrial capitalism: “the pursuit of an 
institutionalised compromise, which will be interclass, international and intergenerational in 
the same time, would be infinitely more complex than a mere domestic capital-labour ‘New 
Deal’” (Lipietz, 1995a, p. 355). The way out of the twin global ecological and Fordist crises 
thus strongly reminds one of a grand bargain, against which “the North/South divide is 
crossed by another divide: the Do Nothing/Do Something” (Lipietz, 1995b, p. 132). This 
account provides new insight on global institutional compromises in a time when 
environmental and economic issues can no longer be dealt with within sovereign States. 
Moreover, the analysis stresses the intimate link between political ecology concerns and the 
international hierarchy in which the division of labour takes place. Yet, in appraising alliances 
most likely to drive a future grand bargain, Lipietz tends to rely excessively on a centralised 
and state-centric understanding of negotiation processes and outcomes. The model still seems 
to be the failed expectations of the 1970s claims for a New International Economic Order, at 
the time supported by a dubious coalition of oil producing states and radical Third World 
regimes. In addition, coalitions are conceived at a level of abstraction largely disconnected 
from actual institutions, legal instruments and sites of political contention in which concrete 
negotiation outcomes take place. Accordingly, the analysis fails to appraise the field of the 
possible where to situate the connection between labour relations and global ecology. Finally, 
such a normative analysis has become to a large extent outdated; the rising ecological 
consciousness and deep transformations of the international division of labour in the context 
of globalisation has resulted in a reconfiguration of the most promising coalitions within the 
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The most prominent argument within regulationist-inspired analyses of post-Fordist growth 
regimes ultimately revolves around the emergence of a finance-led stakeholders’ regime. 
Aglietta has defined such a regime by “the increasingly preponderant role of the asset 
markets, which are the vehicles by which household wealth helps determine macroeconomic 
equilibrium” (Aglietta, 2006, p. 12)
3. Yet, as he reminds us, a mere control by the market 
remains an unlikely candidate for implementing stability and ensuring sufficient social 
cohesiveness out of individual competition: “the feasibility of a mode of regulation geared 
towards social progress depends above all on the type of political mediation” (Aglietta, 2006, 
p. 16). Aglietta suggests that such mediations would target the three following issues: the 
ability to redefine the status of labour on a life-long professional basis, the social ownership 
of capital, and the promotion of women’s social role. The cornerstone of the whole argument, 
however, focuses on capital ownership and how expanding the involvement of labour unions 
in order to rebalance performance criteria of pension funds: “By assimilating the logic 
underlying the stakeholder regime of growth, they would be lending substance to this novel 
aspect of the ‘wage-earner society’, i.e. the advent of a social ownership of capital” (Aglietta, 
2006, p. 29).  
How does the argument on the emergence of a finance-led regime impact upon the 
significance of environmental issues in appraising the future of capitalism? Explicit analysis 
of the various aspects of the ecological crisis has hardly surfaced in the massive debate on the 
supposed emergence of a finance-led stakeholders’ regime. The centrality of the Board if 
Directors in such regime means that a counter-movement taking into account environmental 
concerns would parallel wage earners’ claims targeting corporate governance and pension 
funds management. Aglietta assumes that a political control rebalancing shareholder value 
creation towards a “sustainable value” would include among its core objectives “human 
capital, innovation, and environment in a prospective model where value creation is 
underpinned on a time-based continuity of the firm” (Aglietta, 2005, p. 65).  
Grounds for engaging the finance-led regime thesis are legion as the overall argument 
remains the one on which widespread trends in the regulation literature converge. Against this 
background, it is all the more telling that the core debate around which regulation approaches 
have revolved for a decade or so has hardly anything to say on global ecological concerns 
                                                 
3 This definition is quoted from an English version of a paper originally published in French in 2001 ; the 
finance-led regime argument was first presented in French in 1998 (Aglietta, 1998) ; a revised and broader 
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largely recognised as one the most prominent issues of the 21
st Century. Moreover, in a 
context deeply marked by globalisation, the questions pertaining to the international setting in 
which finance-led stakeholders’ regime discussed by Aglietta and others could operate are 
chiefly confined to their monetary dimension (more particularly, the future of the dollar as the 
key currency of the international monetary system in the context of rising balance of payment 
disequilibrium at the global level). At best, the environment appears as a simple and 
untheorised add-on to a conception of social progress narrowly understood around capital-
labour relationships
4. Thus, the normative lessons drawn from the analytical assumption of 
the finance-led stakeholders’ regime stand out as needing further elaboration. In calling for “a 
conception of social progress that is compatible with a stakeholder regime of growth, and 
above all, that is compatible with globalisation, and with the fact that technological progress 
is currently oriented towards the service sector” (Aglietta, 2006, p. 17), such an approach 
conceives post-Fordism as not intrinsically related to more satisfactory responses to the global 
ecological crisis. 
However unlikely such a connection might appear at first glance, divergent regulationist 
interpretations of the interplay between the twin crises of Fordism and ecology ultimately 
reflect distinct appraisals of the Marxist tradition. According to the Green Althusserian 
perspective of Frieder Otto Wolf, the ecological crisis undoubtedly precedes the crisis of 
Fordism. If the former is not solved first, “the solution of any other contradiction of the 
present conjuncture will remain ineffective” (Wolf, 1988, p. 101). By denying the possibility 
of a joint issue out of both crises, such a perspective now appears extraordinarily 
deterministic as it disconnects one aspect of the problem from the other. O’Connor, for his 
part, analyses capitalist contradictions and the possibilities of a sustainable capitalism as an 
outcome of social struggles, which could eventually mediate between the ecological and 
Fordist crises: “There is a kind of war going on between capital and the environmental 
movements, a war in which these movements might have the effect (intentional or not) of 
saving capital from itself in the long run by forcing it to deal with the negative short-term 
effects of cost shifting” (O'Connor, 1994, p. 164).  
In her appraisal of the tentative ecological sustainability of capitalism from an eco-Marxist 
point of view, Vlachou ends up with a more nuanced account of the contradictory nature of 
                                                 
4 It is not coincidental in this regard that the argument on the social promotion of women is the least detailed and 
persuasive in assessing the mode of regulation supposedly privileged for building a new European Left (Aglietta, 
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the transformation of capitalism to a more environmentally defensible (still capitalist) 
alternative. According to her, “the process of sustainable development [remains] unstable and 
uncertain” (Vlachou, 2004, p. 945); yet “the possibility of a sustainable capitalism can be 
clearly derived from a Marxist analysis of the changes and adjustments made in capitalism in 
response to the ecological problems the latter creates” (Vlachou, 2004, p. 948). In a similar 
vein, the neo-Poulantzian approach of Brand, Görg, and other Germano-Austrian regulationist 
scholars draw on the Frankfurt school of critical theory to consider that so-called post-Fordist 
societal relations with nature are not given, but result from a highly contested process, likely 
to be stabilised by a new kind of global regulation conceived as the “internationalisation of 
the state” (Görg and Brand, 2006). Here too, social struggles are acknowledged as crucial 
elements in the outcome between environmental and material concerns in a post-Fordist 
context, yet more straightforwardly situated at a global level: “A critical theory of the 
internationalization of the state must examine the emerging forms of global domination and 
power relations without appearing disinterested in the multitude of details of the socio-
ecological conflicts” (Görg and Brand, 2006, p. 120). Although resembling the picture of the 
glass either half full or half empty in identifying the current wave of accumulation, these 
accounts are apparently closer to an evolutionary-inspired regulationist interpretation of 
sustainable development issues than prior analyses of the twin crises of ecology and Fordism. 
The study of such socio-ecological conflicts can hardly discard some core insights from 
ecological economics. 
2.2. Ecological economics and the questions of natural limits and throughput 
Ecological economics marks an ontological shift as compared to neoclassical, institutional 
and most regulationist-inspired readings of the causal relations between the economic sphere 
and the biosphere. The biosphere can no longer be characterised as subservient to the 
economic sphere, which in turn rests upon an anthropocentric, utilitarian and instrumental 
view of the relationship of humankind to the environment. The fundamental interdependence 
between social life, its material base and nature can arguably go back to the origin of 
humanity. In the contemporary industrial age, though, the shift in the understanding of the 
economic process as indissociable from the environment appeared in the 1960s. The key 
innovation of the now acclaimed bioeconomist Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen was to 
incorporate the law of entropy into economics and its consequences on long-term growth and 
the future of the planet (Georgescu-Roegen, 1966). The laws of entropy as applied to physics, 









































9- 10 - 
irreversible degradation and, which results in increasing disorder (high entropy) and less 
energy. The lesson that Georgescu-Roegen drew from this law was that the economic process 
in fine transforms the low entropy of energy and materials inherited by humanity into the 
wastage of high entropy. Seen against this background, economic policy should have one, and 
only one, target: to minimise the throughput, i.e. the amount of energy and material used by 
the economic process. Georgescu-Roegen’s catchphrase for this objective is still widely used 
today: to do with less. The iconic vision of spaceship earth launched in 1966 by Boulding is 
another formulation of the challenge that the material underpinnings of human life on earth 
were beginning to face at the time (Boulding, 1966). In that decade and the following one, 
several analyses and reports followed on such an understanding of a potential catastrophic 
future if no radical shift occurred rapidly. Among them, The Limits to Growth report 
published by the Club of Rome in 1972 was probably the most prominent. Interestingly, it 
was commissioned by a body created in 1968 by industrialists worried about the 
‘unsustainability’ of the postwar industrial model.  
Various progressive and radical perspectives have emerged from these beginnings. Among 
them, Herman Daly’s steady-state communitarian economics has been very influential in the 
subsequent development of ecological economics. Although different views existed from the 
outset, this strand of scholarship understood growing environmental concerns as a splendid 
opportunity – or even a precondition – for upsetting the underpinnings of liberal cosmopolitan 
capitalism. Frugality, managed and limited trade, negative growth of the economies of the 
North would enable those of the South to grow (Daly and Cobb, 1989).  
The overall argument of ecological economics is powerful and brings an important counter-
point to most conventional approaches. Particularly by emphasising that the economy will 
always remain a sub-system of the biosphere, it framed the questions of natural limits and 
ecological efficiency as inescapable issues regarding the future of capitalism. Whilst the 
notion of throughput has become central in ecological economics studies on how to minimise 
total input of energy and material and output of waste, industry concerns and political debates 
have also come to the conclusion that a shift towards eco-efficiency would eventually result in 
the rise of industrial ecology, dematerialisation, decarbonisation and the like. Yet, regarding 
the questions of limits and throughput, two major uncertainties remain on the scales at which 
situating ecological economic analyses. On the one hand, there is an ongoing debate on the 
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the load capacity of the biosphere vary greatly. The alarmists, especially Daly (who 
constantly harps on this point), claim that humanity is already taking up 40% of the capacity 
for photosynthesis implicit in the amount of incident sunlight. Others, such as Le Bras (Le 
Bras, 1994, p. 118-144), consider this figure to be 2.5% at most. On the other hand, and most 
importantly, there is no proper criteria to define the time scale on which to appraise ecological 
limits and ways to respond to it by improved throughput. Geophysical time obviously differs 
from that of human history or economic cycles. A new balance between such divergent scales 
is a contested process contingent upon social struggles rather than science-based evidence. 
Moreover, ecological economics dodges the problem of wage-labour relations in assessing the 
relationship between capitalism and nature. Georgescu-Roegen has notoriously stressed that 
the control of exosomatic tools is a substitute for class struggles in the engine of history. 
Despite everything, ecological economics fails to define the scales of environmental problems 
resulting from the crisis of Fordism and excessively relies on normative values, not to 
mention quasi-religious conservationism, in appraising current and future limits to growth. 
Finally, ecological economics tends to under-theorise the global political economy of 
capitalism and, even when theorisation exists, normative considerations are omnipresent, if 
ambivalent. Their implicit normative project wavers between a kind of neo-medieval world 
order in which distinct communities could emancipate themselves from the interstate system 
(Helleiner, 1996) and a recurring call for “self-sufficiency of national communities” 
contentiously drawing upon Keynes’s famous text, National Self-Sufficiency, written in 1933 
((Daly and Cobb, 1989, p. 209-235) – for a critique, see (Damian and Graz, 2001a, p. 604)).  
We now turn to how international political economy approaches may help us to better 
understand the power constellation in which situating such deeply disputed global 
environmental concerns. 
2.3. International political economy and the rise of fragmented global hybrids 
International political economy is a field of study which for the most part originates in 
political science and international relations departments. A basic assumption in much 
conventional international relations scholarship is that international power structures are 
neutral, be it with respect to environmental problems or other issues such as monetary order 
of collective security. This assumption is based in the widespread recognition that in the 
absence of world government able to enforce rules as states do at the domestic level, 
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formal logic of collective action. Accordingly, much debate focuses on whether or not 
sufficient coordination is likely to be implemented in a decentralised interstate system. By 
contrast, critical approaches strongly discard any analysis confining global environmental 
problems to dependant variables of formal and neutral interstate power structures. They tend 
to privilege the global arena over international relationship and stress the transnational 
dynamic in which regulatory practices and structures constraints of contemporary capitalisms 
are situated. They do not treat the international separately, but as one among other key 
components of a holistic understanding of global social relations. As Palan puts it, the 
analysis is premised upon an understanding of “the transnational economy operating within a 
system of fragmented political authority”(Palan, 2000, p. 17).  
Critical approaches which take environmental considerations seriously thus assume that 
responses to the twin global crisis of Fordism and ecology imply coordination mechanisms 
beyond mere international regimes. A central point in many studies is that this “cannot be 
understood separately from the broader shifts in authority in global politics. Such shifts drive, 
both positively and negatively, the development not only of conventional governance 
arrangements … but also and simultaneously, of new governance arrangements, such as 
privatized forms of governance, new corporate NGO arrangements, multilevel governance 
and deterritorialized practices”(Paterson, et al., 2003, p. 7) In order to capture the power 
involved in the interactions between states and non-state actors, we should not merely target 
resources, outcomes and distribution of power focused on decision-making processes across 
issue areas; nor additional layers of governance whose functions would complement 
traditional state functions. States and non-state actors should be considered as a joint 
expression of one broad configuration of structural power.  
Gramscian-inspired interpretations of hegemony closely related to transnational historical 
materialist approaches provide persuasive analytical tools to theorise the overall coherence 
provided by the relationship between state and non-state actors. The notion of hegemony 
refers to the ability to exercise power on such a consensual basis that the orderly structuration 
of interests it favours is less visible, recognised as given and reflecting the general interest. As 
Levy and Burnham argue, “the contested and contingent nature of Gramsci’s notion of 
hegemony finds a path between state-centered accounts of traditional regime theory and 
overly instrumental accounts of corporate power” (Levy and Newell, 2005, p. 64). Whilst this 









































9- 13 - 
scale, it remains unclear whether the ever-increasing fragmentation of economic, political and 
ideological forces underlying environmental concerns should be related to a new form of 
hegemony in the making or rather reflect a lack of comprehensive and consensual 
coordination mechanism in contemporary capitalism.  
Fragmented and less centralised forms of coordination are core features of recent scholarship 
investigating new patterns and agents of power such as transnational private governance and 
international private authority (Cutler, et al., 1999; Graz and Nölke, 2007 forthcoming). 
Brand suggests in this regard that we may live under conditions of “fragmented hegemony” 
world wide, according to which hegemonic social relations prevail within core industrial 
relations – but not in North-South relations (Brand, 2005, p. 171). Fragmentation could well 
define coordination mechanisms beyond the North-South divide.  
In a broader context, the nature and the implications of the rise of less centralised forms of 
coordination look like global hybrids (Graz, 2006). This concept refers to the growing 
importance of fragmented authority on significant issues transcending national borders. More 
precisely, global hybrids blur the types of actors legitimately involved in authority, concern 
issues undermining the distinction between science and society, and pursue a fragmentation of 
the space where the endogenous logic of territorial sovereignty gives way to an exogenous 
logic reinforcing the transnational underpinning of capitalism. Hybrid actors, issues and 
spatial scope are three features which show how little agreement exists on what any 
compromise on the twin crisis of environment and Fordism may look like: the entanglement 
of state and non-state actors; the impact of a new class of object closely related to the political 
implications of science and technology in which situating global environmental problems; the 
increasing irrelevance of territorial units in which considering social forces most likely to 
influence such issues. The concept of global hybrid may thus clarify why fragmentation 
should be seen as constitutive of the new coherence sought in the outstanding shift in the 
articulation between the political and the economic spheres across the globe. Put briefly, 
fragmentation may well underpin coherence, and not the other way round.  
International political economy literature reminds us that international regulatory frameworks 
should not be understood as conventional regime theory to which most regulation approaches 
still refer to. Instead of focusing on most likely collective action implementing coordination 
mechanisms in a decentralised interstate system, the transnational economic dynamic of 
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non-state actors. Without the insights of regulation approaches and distinct strands of 
scholarship within ecological economics, international political economy studies would not be 
able to give adequate attention to the specificity of ecological dynamic and constraints, the 
large scale techno-economic paradigms in which situating global environmental problems, as 
well as the domestic compromises and institutional thickness constraining the shaping of 
environmental issues in a post-Fordist era.  
2.4. Towards an evolutionary environmental regulation 
The concept of evolutionary environmental regulation points towards an attempt to bring 
together ecological economics and international political economy scholarship in opening 
new routes to regulation theory. The concept may help us expand our understanding of 
competing modes of regulation in the wake of Fordism. The notion of regulation obviously 
reflects the centrality of lessons to be drawn from regulation theory. For their part, notions 
such as “environmental” and “evolutionary” bring insights from ecological economics and 
critical approaches in international political economy.  
Regulationist-inspired studies situate responses to the twin crises of Fordism and ecology in 
the longue durée of successive stages of techno-economic paradigms and in the coherence 
sought out of various contradiction resulting from the accumulation regime. How can 
ecological changes in capitalism result in new forms of institutional compromises? Coriat, 
Petit and Schméder argue that a finance-led regime is less likely than others to substitute 
Fordism since it is more “unstable and open to fraud” than usually expected and may 
therefore “well have been part of a transition phase” (Coriat, et al., 2006, p. 97). They 
consider that on a long term basis contemporary changes are likely to bring about a more 
sustainable and internationalised demand-led regime driven by a shift in modes of 
consumption and ways of life. In their attempt to spell out how post-Fordism may result in a 
more “sustainable global order” (Coriat, et al., 2006, p. 312), they make the following 
assumption: “While the transformations in the realm of finance have been pushed forward by 
a set of agents with an international reach, in the domains of consumption and ways of life, 
the objectives have been much more fragmented and uncertain. These objectives … are not 
likely to come out as some big programme or grandiose ideology, but as results of lengthy 
learning processes involving trial and error, through which a new conception of citizenship 
will emerge” (Coriat, et al., 2006, p. 333). This analysis is clearly an attempt to open new 
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remain unclear. First, there is a lack of clear hierarchy between the five canonical structural 
forms distinguished in regulation theory (state; money; international relations; competition; 
wage-labour nexus). Whereas Petit underlines the prominence of one institutional form 
(competition) over the others as “as it emphasises the central logic which conditions the 
evolution of all other forms” (Petit, 2006, p. 108), he does not exclude “the possibility of a 
more mixed combination of forms”(ibid.) and sides with his co-authors in stressing 
fragmentation and uncertainty. The term evolutionary in the concept of environmental 
regulation is precisely an attempt to provide further insight to such an understanding by 
drawing lessons from international political economy analyses of hybrid, fragmented and 
open ended forms of transnational regulation based upon the authority of a wide range of 
states and nonstate actors. From this standpoint, international relations not only gain 
prominence, but structural forms may well differ from the pentagonal framework watched 
over as the core business of regulation theory. Second, whereas the notion of sustainable 
global order is emphasised, the environmental dimension of the notion is neglected. Nowhere 
does the analysis engage the contradictory nature of the transformation of capitalism towards 
a more environmentally defensible alternative. The term environmental in the concept of 
evolutionary regulation conspicuously points to the assumption that ecological concerns can 
no longer be left as a marginal issue. However divergent ecological economic analyses may 
be, their contribution will be to have brought the question of natural limits and the necessity 
of ingrained ecological efficiency to centre stage in providing a response to the challenge of 
throughput in the economic process.  
Against this background, evolutionary environmental regulation can be defined as a set of 
coordinated, yet fragmented, hybrid and open-ended practices which impact upon the growth 
regime, its inscription into nature and environmental constraints, and as well as its political 
and institutional embeddedness at a global level. This clearly supposes a more fragmented and 
evolutionary framework than the one envisioned in most finance-led regime analyses 
emphasising the strategic importance taken by the Board of Directors for shareholder value 
creation and distributional issues. By substituting grand narratives on potential worldwide 
compromises out of the global ecological crisis for manifold scattered initiatives and 
pragmatic programs, the potential evolutionary environmental regime epitomises one form 
among the many taken by global hybrids in a context of transnational private governance. 
Despite a high degree of fragmentation, it may result in a complex web of ad hoc 
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looked for elsewhere than in the hopelessness of centrally-organised comprehensive 
compromises backed up by hegemonic powers and intergovernmental organisations. As open-
ended, fragmented and hybrid, the coherence of evolutionary environmental regulation 
reinforces the extreme difficulty to think about ecological regularities. The remainder of this 
paper examines how such an understanding of an evolutionary environmental regulation may 
provide an account of the apparently paradoxical situation we have reached, in which a shared 
disillusion regarding sustainable development joins shared awareness on the inescapability of 
a policy shift in its favour.  
3.  Towards a sustainable capitalism: survival in a quagmire? 
Utopian expectations arising from the debate on sustainable development focused on a 
sweeping regime change, particularly in the domain of consumption habits (to do with less) 
and uneven capitalist development structures. A global transformation of contemporary 
capitalism following a radical understanding of sustainable development can be seen as utopia 
par excellence and, for the time being, remains out of sight. Yet this does not mean that 
environmental chaos prevails. On the contrary, recent developments provide strong evidence 
of emerging, if fragmented, environmental regulation. 
Regarding consumer habits, 20 years of discussions and negotiations following the statement 
of US President George Bush Sr. at the Rio conference that the American way of life was not 
negotiable has taught us that there is more truth than not in this claim. Herbert Simon pointed 
out two decade before Rio that “Man is the insatiable animal. No matter what he has, he can 
conceive of having more. In the face of Man’s insatiability, how do we limit, as ultimately we 
must, the demands he places on Nature?” (Simon, 1973). Should one cast doubt on assuming 
inherent traits of human nature, the expected rise of a global middle class will inexorably 
impinge on consumption habits worldwide. As a recent World Bank Report on the prospects 
of the next wave of globalisation points out, faster growth in developing countries might 
result in disruptive threats to the global commons if, by 2030, fully 1.2 billion people in 
developing countries (15% of the world population) belong to the global middle class . This 
large group will participate in the global marketplace, demand world class products and have 
the purchasing power to buy automobiles, many consumer durables and travel abroad (World 
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Consumptions habits are one thing, levels of consumption are another though. World 
population has almost doubled since Paul and Ann Ehrlich published the P Bomb. In 15 years, 
the global waged labour force has also approximately doubled (from bn 1.5 to bn 3) and, 
therefore, doubled the number of people around the world expecting to rise their level of 
consumption. According to the world Bank, by 2030, the world’s labor force will number 
some 4,1 billion workers, 90 percent of whom will live in the developing world (World Bank, 
2006, p. xvi). If one adds GDP per capita growth to the impact of population growth, further 
doubts can be cast on the long term sustainability of capitalism, even with technical 
innovations (Dosi and Grazzi, 2006). 
Regarding the failure of sustainable development to significantly enhance worldwide 
inequality, we should not forget that Gro Harlem Brundtland explicitly viewed sustainable 
development as a “political concept for human social, economic and environmental progress”, 
which would allow all of us “to move from one earth to one world” (Brundtland, 1993, p. 19 
and 26). Few would deny that regulation of sustainable development at that level of 
institutionalisation is in no way within sight in the current context. Multilateral environmental 
agreements could have become privileged fora to negotiate compromises including monetary 
compensations and technological transfers Yet, whenever substantial power and wealth issues 
are at stake at the global or domestic level alike, no agreement is reached, or at best that looks 
like window dressing. In a less sceptical tone, existing regimes are largely viewed as already 
entering into an “ossification” phase (Depledge, 2006). 
A widely acknowledged pragmatic view against such a pessimistic understanding of 
environmental and ecological issues is instrumental in reinforcing the emergence of a 
fragmented environmental regulation. By and large, pragmatic claims rely on three 
assumptions. First, technical progress will always enable a substitution of natural capital for 
artificial or man-made capital (Solow, 1974). For instance, when global warming results in a 
lack of snow in ski resorts, snow cannons are designed to produce artificial snow. As 
Nordhaus (1973) (1973) noted, ‘backstop technologies’ exist to project the current state of 
technological innovation as a ratchet mechanism into the future.  
A second core argument is that further liberalisation favours growth and additional resources 
available for sustainable development. This is for example the key issue of the contrasted 
pieces of evidence regarding a potential diminution of pollutant emissions once a defined 
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shape curve between pollutant emissions and growth stands at the core of the so-called 
environmental Kuznets curve. It is arguably the core and only theoretical framework behind 
the Agenda 21 mission statement adopted at the Rio earth Summit of 1992, namely to 
promote sustainable development by trade (Damian and Graz, 2001b). In that perspective, 
there is no more irresolvable contradiction between economic growth and the environment. 
On the contrary, the economy and the environment can be conceived as being mutually 
reinforcing to the benefit of society in general.  
A third assumption of pragmatic approaches is that solutions to the global problem of 
sustainable development are to be found at the micro level of economic actors. As Stephan 
Schmidheiny, Chairman of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development, put it, 
“business should be the engine of sustainable development”  (Schmidheiny and Business 
Council for Sustainable Development, 1992, in Damian/Graz 2001:31). The implementation 
of development and environmental policies at a global as well as local level widely 
disseminated that model. Moreover, in 1993, the Environmental Department of the World 
Bank swiftly laid ground for a very similar understanding of sustainable development as 
driven by three entwined economic, social, and environmental pillars (Munasinghe, 1993). 
Today hardly any analysis of sustainable development would be made without reference to 
three pillars. The managerial conversion of such an analysis is the ‘triple bottom line’ 
framework. (Elkington, 1998). The catchy Planet Profit People title of the 2001 Shell annual 
report may be seen as greenwash communication strategy (Shell Report 2001). Yet, at the 
same time, it reflects the challenge that major multinational corporations around the world 
now face. Undoubtedly, they remain far from fully accountable in this respect; they do 
however take up the expectations arising from accepting to be publicly concerned by 
sustainable development claims. 
The three basic assumptions of technical progress, liberalisation and entrepreneurship 
represent pragmatic responses to sustainable development. Privileged instruments massively 
borrow from the neoclassical toolbox. Environmental taxes, property rights, pollution permits, 
emission trading are only the most prominent of the market incentives that contribute to the 
demise of public regulation identified as inefficient and undemocratic command and control 
policies. Yet difficulties faced in implementing such market incentives have been much 
tougher than expected and now represent a major problem even in the most advanced market-
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forceful environmental tax regime to such a point that the most fervent advocates of market 
incentives see no way other than collective preferences to better obey economists’ textbooks 
(Pearce, 2006)! Such an understanding reflects the assumption that mere economic calculation 
based on price signals remain largely unsatisfactory for tackling unsustainability (Sinclair-
Desgagné, 2005).  
Against this background, there is clearly a shared disillusion on the implementation of 
sustainable development since the publication of Our Common Future 20 years ago. In a 
recent issue of one of the leading journals on the topic, three economists – including a former 
President of the International Society for Ecological Economics – identify the post-
Brundtland world as a quagmire. Nevertheless they consider that sustainable development can 
help us sort out the ongoing challenges of environment and development: “the case for 
pluralism in the analysis and normative construction of sustainable development, highlighting 
how an amalgam of ideas from recent work in ecological economics, political ecology, and 
freedom-oriented development might advance the sustainable development debate beyond its 
post-Brundtland quagmire” (Sneddon, et al., 2006, p. 255). Such a claim echoes those 
scholars summoning up more modesty in targeting a synthesis between ecological economics 
and neoclassical environmental economics, in contrast to the preceding debate opposing 
advocates of strong versus weak sustainability (Konchak and Pascual, 2006; Venkatachalam, 
2006 in press; Wagner, 2006). It remains to be seen, however, whether the new ‘pluralistic, 
theoretically informed praxis of sustainable development based on a renewed commitment to 
practices of deliberative democracy” (Sneddon, et al., 2006, p. 255) is not another case of 
wishful thinking, a third way out of the opposition between a cooperative global 
environmental governance and neoliberal economic globalisation.  
And yet! A flurry of fragmented, hybrid, open-ended guidelines for survival in a time of 
global ecological crisis and post-Fordist restructuring has gained significance in the last 20 
years. Each on its own terms has resulted in ad-hoc solutions gradually making headways and 
reinforcing recent initiatives. In this regard, climate change has made daily headlines since 
late 2006. No surprise if one remember the most recent conclusions reached by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: “Anthropogenic warming and sea level rise 
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feedbacks, even if greenhouse gas concentrations were to be stabilized”
5. Whilst Nicholas 
Stern, the UK’s government adviser on the economics of climate change and development, 
sent a stark message in a report predicting the prospect of an economic downturn on the scale 
of the great depression unless structural shift is implemented at a global level to slash 
greenhouse gas emission, countless organisations such as Climate Care in the UK, Action 
Carbone in France, or the privately-owned company Carbon Footprint offer on a largely 
fragmented basis ad-hoc solutions for offsetting carbon emission as a way to repair the 
damage that air travel does to the climate. Likewise, as a forceful regime shift regarding 
environmental taxes faces considerable limits, an ever wider range of corporate social 
responsibility initiatives invent new ways to include global warming concerns in private-
public partnerships addressing development concerns and entrepreneurial ventures alike. It is 
all the more telling in this context that the 2007 Human Development Report of the United 
Nations Programme on Development specifically explores all sorts of responses to the ways 
in which climate change presents a clear and present danger for a large section of humanity by 
increasing vulnerability and widening income, gender and regional inequalities.  
4.  Conclusion  
This paper provides a critical and disenchanted account of the problematique and 
implementation of sustainable development. Yet, 20 years after the launch of the concept, 40 
years after the term environment entered the political arena, and even more than 60 years after 
what the historian of the environmental movement Worster (1992, p. 365) called the birth of 
the ecological age in reference to the testing of the first atomic bomb in New Mexico in 1945, 
we seem to be confronted by a paradoxical situation in which privileged Northern societies 
and the global South alike are faced by the problems of sustainable development on their 
everyday life. It has become almost idiomatic in any policy issue, even if no further 
agreement has been reached on what sustainability fundamentally means. 
An evolutionary perspective appears to be of particular relevance shedding light on the 
shared disillusion regarding sustainable development. Issues pertaining to inter- and intra-
generational equity, and ecosystems vulnerability and collapse cannot be solved by sound 
science; they will always reflect a political economy configuration of social forces that imply 
fundamental distributional struggles and conflicting discourses over the potential 
compromises sought out in such a context. Moreover, such an apparently paradoxical 
                                                 
5 Working Group I of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate Change 2007: The 
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situation only reflects the continuum that spreads all along greenwashing and incremental 
change on the one hand, and radical change, notably inspired by Georgescu-Roegen’s 
bioeconomic program on the other. Ultimately, if we take the impact of the entropy law on the 
intrinsic limits faced by any global political economy configuration seriously, we should 
remember Mayumi’s (2001, p. 45) definitive statement: “The true question facing 
bioeconomic beings consists in the choice of the suitable rate of increase in entropy in the 
long term”(italics from the author). There is of course no standard for such a rate of increase, 
only institutional compromises reflecting ongoing political economy struggles. As Levy and 
Newell put it from a Gramcian-inspired account of global environmental governance, 
“corporate environmental management represents a series of strategies and accommodation 
that help to shore up corporate legitimacy and autonomy and deflect the threat of more drastic 
regulation. It is thus more about political and economic than environmental sustainability” 
(Levy and Newell, 2005, p. 59). 
It is against such a background that the paper has explored evidence of an emerging form of 
evolutionary environmental regulation. In a recent special issue taking up the debates between 
regulation theory and sister approaches, several authors pointed out that regulationist theory 
continues to face a tension between structuro-cyclical approaches and more evolutionary 
perspectives replacing economico-technological determinism (Dannreuther and Petit, 2006). 
As Palan (2006, p. 247) points out, an evolutionary position “places the emphasis on an 
evolutionary process of trials and errors by which something that can be described 
retrospectively as a regime emerges”. The emergence of evolutionary environmental 
regulation should be seen from such an institutionalist interpretation of history. 
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